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Shams: Employer Free
Speech in Union Organizing Campaigns
NOTES
EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH IN UNION ORGANIZING
CAMPAIGNS
An employer who learns that a labor union is attempting to organize his employees may feel that he has some interests at stake in
the matter. He may also wish to ensure that his employees, for their
own good, are afforded full information upon which to make their
decision. In either event one thing is clear: if the employer wishes
to play an effective role his course of action will have to be planned
and executed without delay. The acute urgency of the situation
sharply distinguishes it from many of the more usual problems the
employer may submit to his counsel for advice, in which a statute of
limitations may be the only truly decisive time-limiting factor.
The central queston may well be, "What may the employer say
to his employees and under what circumstances may he say it?" In
the early days of the Wagner Act' the answer was simply defined: the
employer could say nothing that might have an impact on employee
choice. Later, however, the courts and the NLRB developed more
complex but perhaps fairer solutions designed to give recognition
to the employer's right to freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. These solutions drew
distinctions between legitimate employer speech and speech that led
to the finding of an unfair labor practice or provided a basis for
setting aside representation election results favorable to the employer.
The purpose of this note is to chart briefly the development of
the law of employer free speech and to suggest, by way of specific
example, what the employer may now rightfully say in combating
union organizing within the bounds of privileged speech.
THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND

Strict Neutrality
Between 1935 and 1941, the first six years of the Wagner Act, the
NLRB required employers to maintain a position of strict neutrality
toward unions' attempts to organize their employees. Spelled differently, strict neutrality meant strict non-interference. Despite the
employer's right to freedom of speech under the United States Constitution, the Board sternly disapproved of his attempts to combat
union organizing by means of anti-union expressions in speeches,
notices, letters, and other communications.2

Emphasizing the em-

1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935); 29 U.S.C. §§151-66 (1946).
2. E.g., Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501 (1939); Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 431 (1936) (speech); The Triplett Elec. Instrument
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ployer's economic power over his employees," and conceiving of its
own proper role as one of shielding struggling unions during their
infancy, the Board considered that such employer expressions constituted unfair labor practices under section 8 (a) (1)' of the NLRA
because of their inherently coercive effect.The Totality of Conduct Doctrine and The Context Rule

In 1941, as a result of the United States Supreme Court decision in
Virginia Electric and Power Company,G the Board was forced to alter

its strict neutrality rule and abandon its premise of the inherentlN
coercive nature of employer speech. The employer in this case had
posted a bulletin and had made speeches found to be in and of themselves non-coercive. Standing alone, therefore, they could not be
violative of the act. However, the Court defined a new "totalit) of
conduct" test in holding that, although the statements were not coercive per se, the Board could consider them in the light of the whole
complex of the employer's activities to determine whether they
should be raised to the stature of coercion.: As a result of the Virgini
Electric case, an employer was no longer bound to reman silent during
a representation campaign; he could speak out and, in so doing, be
protected by the First Amendment. However, he was required to
exercise care that his utterances, in light of his "whole course of conduct," did not have the effect of coercion. Even before the passage ol
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the Board had adopted the Virginia
Electric totality of conduct doctrine that employer speech does not
constitute an unfair labor practice unless coercive, and that such
coercion must be shown by looking beyond the speech itself to it'
surrounding circumstances.?
In brief, this was the state of the law prior to the enactment ol
section 8 (c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the "employer free speech" se(tion, in which Congress declared that:"
"The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
Co. 5 N.L.R.B. 835 (1938) (handbill).
3. E.g., The Falk Corp., 6 N.L.R.B. 654 (1938); Williams Nlfg. Co.. (i N.L.R.B
135 (1938).
4. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §158(1) (1946).
5. Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 62 N.L.R.B. 212 (19-15); Rapid Roller Co
.
NLRB 126 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1942).
6. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 31-1 U.S. 469 (1941).
7. Id. at 479.
8. E.g., Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp. 68 N.L.R.B. 805 (1946); Ebco Mfg. Co.
67 N.L.R.B. 210 (1946).
9. National Labor Relations Act §8(c), added by 61 Stat. 142 (1947), as
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visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit."
Neither the section itself nor its legislative history clarifies the question
of whether factors outside the four corners of the employer's speech can
be considered in determining whether the speech is an unfair labor
practice. The final version of the amendment was a composite of the
two bills proposed by the House and Senate committees. 10 The House
committee repudiated the totality of conduct doctrine," whereas the
Senate committee tacitly approved it.12 The conference agreement
adopted the House bill with the doctrine deleted altogether."
Despite the lack of express mention of the totality of conduct
doctrine in section 8 (c) as finally enacted, subsequent court and
Board decisions interpreted the section to constitute a general codification of the doctrine. The case decisions continued to reflect
the view that employer speech must be evaluated in light of his
1
total course of conduct. 4
In recent decisions the Board has shifted its course in degree from
the original totality of conduct doctrine. The Board now considers
employer statements and speeches in the "context" in which they were
uttered." The distinction between the "context rule" and the totality
of conduct doctrine may be of some practical significance. Under the
totality of conduct doctrine, consideration was given to an employer's
entire history of conduct toward a union, whether or not it was
directly relevant to the particular speech in question. 6 Under the
Board's new context rule, however, the tendency is to consider only
the employer's activities directly related to and intimately associated
with the speech in determining the question of its coercive effect.The Captive Audience Doctrine
Shortly before the enactment of section 8 (c) the Board developed
amended, 29 U.S.C. §158 (c) (1958).
10. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947).
11. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §8(d) (1947).
12. S.1126, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. §8(c) (1947).
13. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947).
14. E.g., NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co., 178 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 810 (1950); NLRB v. La Salle Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949);
NLRB v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 175 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949).
15. Cary Lumber Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 406 (1953).
16. NLRB v. New England Upholstery Co., 268 F.2d 590 (Ist Cir. 1959).
17. E.g., Corning Glass Works, 100 N.L.R.B. 444 (1952); Park Bros., 101
N.L.R.B. 872 (1952).
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a variation of the totality of conduct doctrine to be applied to employer anti-union speeches given on company property and time. In
Clark Brothers,18 the Board ruled that such speeches were coercive
per se because of their "captive audience" aspect and therefore constituted unfair labor practices regardless of their content or other
circumstances. When Congress later added section 8 (c) to the statute,
the Board abandoned the position that captive audience speeches
were illegal per se.' 9 But the dictum of the second circuit court in
the Clark Brothers case to the effect that a captive audience speech
is not an unfair labor practice if the union has an equal opportunity
to speak to the employees,'2 was an early expression of what later became a major doctrinal development in the area of employer speech.
Later decisions, discussed below, have tended to view the question as
whether employers may speak to their employees on company propertN
and time while denying the union an equal opportunity to reply.
In 1951, the Board held in Bonvit Teller"2 that an employer who
prohibited the use of company property for union organizational
activities, but who himself held an anti-union meeting on company
time and property, was required to permit the union, upon request, to
hold a similar meeting. Refusal to do so was held to be an unfair
labor practice and sufficient reason to invalidate a subsequent election.
To thoroughly understand the rationale behind Bonwit Teller, it
is necessary briefly to reach back to the early days of the Wagner Act
when the Board laid down its "no-solicitation" rules. To combat
union organization, employers adopted rules prohibiting solicitation
on company premises. The Board held such no-solicitation rules to be
legal if they prohibited union activity on company property only
during working hours, but struck down rules purporting to prohibit
union solicitation during non-working hours."- A "privileged nosolicitation rule" exception was granted to retail and department
store employers, who were permitted to prohibit union solicitation
on the selling floor at all times,"- 3 since this measure was considered
necessary for efficient operation of the business.'

18. Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
19. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
20. NLRB v. Clark Bros., 163 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1947).
21. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
22. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
23. May Department Stores, 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), enforced, 154 F.2d 533
(8th Cir. 1946).
24. It should be noted that no-solicitation rules are not treated as valid or

invalid per se purely on the basis of their application during working or nonworking hours or to retail establishments. Such factors merely determine whether
a particular rule is "presumptively" valid or invalid. For example, a no-solicitation
rule effective in a non-retail establishment during working hours is presumptively
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It is against this background that the facts in Bonwit Teller25
must be analyzed. There the employer invoked a rule against union
solicitation during working hours and on the retail selling floor at all
times. The president of the company assembled the employees in
the store and read to them a speech which, although anti-union in
content, was clearly non-coercive. The entire occurrence took place
on the selling floor during working hours. The union later requested
an opportunity to reply to the employer's speech but the request was
not acknowledged by the company.
Although it did not attempt to label the non-coercive captive
audience speech an unfair labor practice per se, the Board held that
the employer, by using company property and time to campaign
against the union while denying the union a similar right, had enforced its privileged no-solicitation rule in a discriminatory manner,
and thus had interferred with its employees' right of self-organization
giving rise to an unfair labor practice. The Board then made reference
to "an even more fundamental reason" for finding the employer guilty
of an unfair labor practice: 26
"The right of employees, guaranteed by Section 7 . . . . [is]
the right to hear both sides of the story under circumstances
which reasonably approximate equality."
On appeal, the second circuit court considered the question to
be solely one of discriminatory enforcement of the no-solicitation rule
and rejected the Board's alternative "equal opportunity doctrine."
The court pointed out that if the employer were to abandon the
no-solicitation rule, it would not be required to accord the union a
similar opportunity to address the employees each time it made an
27
anti-union speech.
In a later second circuit case 28 in which the Board had held that
the employer had committed an unfair labor practice solely by denying the union an equal opportunity to reply, Judge Learned Hand
clarified the court's holding in Bonwit Teller by directly linking the
unlawfulness of the employer's conduct to the no-solicitation rule.
Judge Hand rejected the Board's equal opportunity doctrine altogether. He pointed out that if the employer has a valid no-solicitation
valid. The presumption may be rebutted, however, by a showing that the rule was
adopted for a discriminatory purpose rather than for legitimate business reasons.
See Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961).
25. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
26. Id. at 612.
27. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 905 (1953).
28. NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 205 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953).
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rule, or none at all, his conduct, in addressing the employees on
company property during working hours and refusing a similar
opportunity to the union, would not constitute an unfair labor practice. However, if an invalid or retailer's privileged no-solicitation rule
is in effect, it is an unfair labor practice for the employer to address
employees or otherwise campaign against the union on company property and time.
Until its composition changed in 1953, the Board continued to
follow the equal opportunity doctrine, whether the employer enforced
a no-solicitation rule or not,2" despite the second circuit court's rejection of the doctrine.30
In the Livingston Shirts3 case the 1953 Board retreated from the
broad equal opportunity doctrine of Bonwit Teller, by restricting
the application of the doctrine to circumstances in which there is
(1) a retailer's privileged no-soliciation rule, or (2) an unlawful nosolicitation rule. The Board thus indicated its intention to continue
to apply the rule, despite its rejection by the second circuit court,
to department and other retail stores which invoke a privileged nosolicitation rule. Such employers would still be permitted to give
captive audience speeches on condition that the union be given equal
opportunity to reply. With respect to non-retail establishments, the
Livingston Shirt case virtually nullified the equal opportunity rule
by holding that it would apply only when it is unnecessary, i.e., when
the employer enforces an unlawful no-solicitation rule which itself
constitutes an unfair labor practice.
In NLRB v. United Steelworkers,-32 the Supreme Court prescribed
a new approach to the problem of employer speech. In this case a
non-retail employer enforced a valid no-solicitation rule (effective
only during working hours), but himself engaged in an anti-union
campaign during working hours by direct solicitation and captive
audience speeches. The issue was whether the employer thereby committed an unfair labor practice. The Court declared that the legality
of an employer's conduct in applying an "otherwise valid" no-solicitation rule, and the union's right to use company property and time
to reply, depend upon "whether the employer's conduct to any considerable degree create[s] an imbalance in the opportunities for
organizational communication."33 Essential evidentiary factors to be
considered are the union's access to alternative channels of communi29. E.g., Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953);
Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951).
30. See notes 27, 28 supra.
31. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
32. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
33. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 362 (1958).
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cation and whether the union has requested an opportunity to reply.3 4
If, despite the no-solicitation rule, the union's opportunities are "at
least as great as the employer's ability to promote the legally authorized
expression of his anti-union views," the union cannot seek to invalidate
the "otherwise valid" rule.
The Steelworkers case, in substance, repudiated the Board's earlier
attempts to determine the legality of employers' application of nosolicitation rules without regard to the extent to which the union
is actually hurt. Rejecting "mechanical answers" to "this non-mechanical, complex problem in labor-management relations," 35 the
Court indicated that henceforth the Board's evaluation of employer
anti-union campaigning in the presence of "otherwise valid" nosolicitation rules must include a determination of the real effect of
the employer's conduct on the union's opportunities to communicate
with the employees.
In a recent Board decision, May Department Stores,36 some doubt
was created about the exact manner in which the Supreme Court's
reformulation of the principles of employer speech in the Steelworkers
case would be applied by the "New Frontier" Board. The retail
employer in this case had a privileged no-solicitation rule effective in
selling areas during both working and non-working hours. During
the course of the union's organizing campaign, the employer made
noncoercive anti-union speeches to employees and denied the union's
request for equal opportunity to address the employees on company
property and time. The Board upheld the union's contention that
the employer's conduct constituted an unfair labor practice and therefore justified setting aside the election.
The Board majority declared that the Bonwit Teller case squarely
controlled the issue in the May case, and rejected the employer's contention that the Steelworkers case required a different result. Apparently without requiring the union to present specific evidence of a
lack of alternative methods of communication, the majority held
that the employer had created a "glaring 'imbalance in opportunities
for organizational communication' "3 by seizing for himself the most
advantageous means of communication while relegating the union to
"relatively catch-as-catch-can methods of rebuttal ...."38
Board Members Rodgers and Leedom dissented on the ground
34. The Court pointed out that "the employer is not obliged voluntarily and
without any request to offer the use of his facilities and the time of his employees
for pro-union solicitation" since, by so doing, he may commit an unfair labor
practice. Id. at 363.
35. Id. at 364.
36. 136 N.L.R.B ._. 49 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1962).
37. Id. at 1864.
38. Id. at 1864.
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that the majority holding was not supported by Steelworkers principles. Member Rodgers charged that although the majority had
"framed their conclusion in the language used by the Supreme Court,
in the [Steelworkers] case," they had "neither considered the existence of alternative channels, nor evaluated their possible effectiveness." 3 9 The majority finding of an "imbalance in opportunities,"
Member Rodgers claimed, was "predicated solely on the denial to the
40
Union of a channel of communication used by the Employer.It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the May decision represents something less than a wholehearted application of the principles
defined by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers case. Although the
language of the Steelworkers decision without doubt represents the
present law in the area of employer free speech, there remains considerable doubt how the law will be applied in specific cases as they
arise. Presumably the Steelworkers principles will receive relatively
full effect in cases involving non-retail employers. The May case indicates, however, that the majority of the present Board is reluctant
to totally discard the Bonwit Teller doctrine, as limited by Livingston Shirt, in cases involving retail employers. Retail employers with
privileged no-solicitation rules who make anti-union speeches while
denying the union an opportunity to reply must reckon with the
present Board's apparent readiness, as shown in the May case, to find
an imbalance of opportunities without an overly strict insistence that
the complaining union thoroughly demonstrate the lack of effective
alternative channels of communication.
Free Speech in RepresentationElections
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act the Board generally refused to set
aside representation elections on grounds of employer pre-election
speech or conduct unless the speech or conduct was found to be an
unfair labor practice.41 In section 8 (c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, Congress declared that employer speech would no longer constitute an unfair labor practice unless it contained a "threat of re'
prisal or force or promise of benefit. ' 42
Although Congress did not
mention representation elections in section 8 (c), it may reasonably
have assumed, on the basis of earlier Board practice, that by restrictively defining the categories of employer speech that could constitute
39.
40.
41.
&Sons,
42.

Id. at 1866.
Id. at 1866.
E.g., Hercules Motors Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 650, 654 (1947); M.T. Stcens
68 N.L.R.B. 229, 231 (1946).
National Labor Relations Act §8 (c), added by 61 Stat. 142

(1947),

as

amended, 29 U.S.C. §158 (c) (1958).
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unfair labor practices, it was thereby also limiting the Board's authority to set elections aside. Nevertheless, the Board construed section
8 (c) literally as applying only to unfair labor practice determinations
and developed new criteria by which employer speech privileged
under section 8 (c) may provide grounds for setting aside an election
43
although it does not constitute an unfair labor practice.
In the General Shoe case,44 the employer conducted a vigorous preelection campaign by means of letters, pamphlets, speeches, and sending foremen to propagandize employees in their homes. Even though
the employer's statements contained no threats of reprisal or promise
of benefit, and therefore were privileged under section 8 (c), the Board
set aside the election and stated that "conduct that creates an atmosphere calculated to prevent a free and untrammeled choice by the
employees will sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even
though that conduct may not constitute an unfair labor practice."' 45
To justify setting aside the election on these grounds, the Board con4
cluded: 6
"'When we are asked to invalidate elections held under our
auspices, our only consideration derives from the Act which
calls for freedom of choice by employees as to a collective bargaining representative' . . . . When a record reveals conduct
so glaring that it is almost certain to have impaired employees'
freedom of choice, we have set an election aside and directed a
new one.... [T]he Board has exercised this power sparingly.
The question is one of degree."
In those cases in which the Board sets aside an election without
finding an employer unfair labor practice, no basis exists for issuance
of a cease and desist order; the new election is merely postponed until
it appears that an atmosphere exists in which a free choice of representatives is possible. It would appear, therefore, that the employer
might continue his anti-union campaign within the bounds of section
8 (c) privileged speech and thereby forestall a new election indefinitely.
Subsequent Board decisions 4' have helped to illuminate the limits
of the General Shoe doctrine. In these decisions the Board, in refusing
43. Congressmen Landrum and Griffin recently charged that Board decisions
setting aside elections on the basis of employer speech, without findings of unfair
labor practices, were contrary to the Congressional intent embodied in §8 (c). 108
CONe. RaE. 5702 (daily ed. April 10, 1962).
44. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
45. Id. at 126.
46. Id. at 126. See also the discussion of the General Shoe doctrine in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 935 (1950).
47. E.g., L.G. Everist, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 810 (1955); A.S. Abell Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 362 (1953); National Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953).
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to set aside elections, has based its refusal on the grounds that the
employer speech in question was privileged under section 8 (c). Some
commentators 5 have suggested that such cases may have reversed the
General Shoe doctrine by implication. Close reading of the cases reveals, however, that in addition to finding the employer speech
privileged under 8 (c), the Board takes care to point out that the
speech did not "prevent their [the employees'] exercise of a free
choice"' 9 or to use similar language expressive of the General Shoe
doctrine. These cases would seem only to affirm the Board's statement
in General Shoe that it exercises the power to set aside elections absent
proof of an unfair labor practice "sparingly." 50 As the Board further
31
pointed out in General Shoe, "[T]he question is one of degree." '
If, for example, the employer speech consists merely of an expression
of opinion or of his preference to deal with his employees directly
rather than through a labor organization, the Board will probably
invoke section 8 (c) to avoid upsetting the election. On the other hand,
the Board will set aside an election if the employer's speech generates
a fear of economic loss by inferring the possibility of a plant shutdown
if the union should prevail.52 In what was probably the most radical
application of the General Shoe doctrine to date, moreover, the Board
set aside an election because conduct of the community itself, that
was neither instigated nor condoned by the employer, created an
"atmosphere of fear."!-"
In the Peerless Plywood"' case, the Board defined a second set ol
circumstances in which employer speech privileged under section 8 (c)
may provide a basis for setting an election aside. This case defined
the rule that if the employer delivers an otherwise privileged captive
audience speech less than twenty-four hours before an election, the
election may be set aside. The Board found justification for the
rule in its "statutory authority and obligation to conduct elections
in circumstances and under conditions which will insure employees
a free and untrammeled choice."--, The objective is to prevent both
unions and employers from obtaining an unfair campaign advantage.
The employer should note the scope of this arbitrary rule. The
Board has held that it is permissible for the employer to deliver
48. 18 GA. BAR. J. 219, 222 (1955); 5 Lxi. L.J. 270, 276 (195-).
49. L.G. Everist, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 810. 812 (1955).

50. Supra note 44, at 126.
51. Supra note 44, at 126.
52.

Aragon Mills, 135 N.L.R.B.

49 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1962); R.D. Cole Mfg.

49 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1961): NLRB v. New England Upholsterv
Co., 133 N.L.R.B .
Co., 268 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1959).
53. James Lees 8:Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 290 (1961).
54. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
55. Id. at 429. Unions as well as employers are .ubjcct to the Peerlen Plywood rule.
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a captive audience speech less than twenty-four hours before the
election if attendance is voluntary and on the employees' own time.56
Furthermore, the rule does not interfere with the right of employers
to circulate campaign literature on or off the company premises at
any time prior to an election, nor does it prohibit the use of any other
57
legitimate propaganda media.
To summarize, the Board has defined two separate tests by which
it may set aside an election on the basis of employer speech privileged
under section 8 (c). An election may be set aside if
(1) the employer speech creates an atmosphere of fear which
renders free choice by the employees improbable; as or
(2) the employer delivers a captive audience speech within
the twenty-four hour period before the election,59 unless attendance is voluntary and on the employees' own time. 0
WHAT THE EMPLOYER MAY SAY

The concluding discussion, based upon NLRB and court decisions,
will be devoted to illustrating what the employer may legally say to
his employees during a union's organizing campaign. It cannot be
overemphasized that the following suggestions should be considered
in light of the fact that labor law is in a constant state of change. It
must also be remembered that the line between what may properly
be said and what may not is a fine one; often the determination depends upon exactly how a statement is couched and the context in
which it is presented. It is most important to evaluate the language
used in light of all the surrounding circumstances.
What the employer has done in the past to maintain satisfactory
employee relationships will have much greater bearing upon his
chance to remain free from union interference than the most vigorous
last-minute anti-union campaign. An active program may be important, however, to ensure that his employees recognize his past and
present efforts in their behalf.
Assuming that the proprietor of a non-union laundry plant learns
that union organizers are in town contacting employees of similar
plants, probably the most important problem confronting the employer
is to determine what he may say to combat union organization without
committing an unfair labor practice or risk having a favorable election
set aside.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Fisher Grocery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1954).
Supra note 54, at 430.
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
Fisher Grocery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1954).
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The employer -and his supervisors, since he is generally responsible for their actions- - will commit an unfair labor practice if he
interferes with the employees' legal right to organize themselves into
a union if they so desire.62 However, as long as he merely expresses
his opinion and advances arguments against the union without intimidation, coercion, or promises of benefit, and makes it clear that the
employees have a free choice without fear of reprisal, the employer's
statements come within the protective ambit of section 8 (c) and
therefore are not unfair labor practices.C3
The employer may remind his employees of their existing company benefits and explain the disadvantages of union membership.
His opinions, predictions, arguments, and statements of his legal
position may be communicated to his employees by distributing
literature at all times,eG4 or by means of noncoercive and nonpromissory
speeches to all of his employees on company time and property'C
(until twenty-four hours before the commencement of an election).3"
Written forms of communication may be most effective, since the
delivery of a captive audience speech may require the employer to
give the union an equal opportunity to reply if he has a no-solicitation rule the enforcement of which creates an imbalance of opportunities in organizational communication.
(In cases of retail stores
with privileged no-solicitation rules, the Board will probably require
the employer to honor the union's request to reply.)6 8 Since it is the
Board that determines whether there is an "imbalance,"I" it may not
be wholly clear in advance whether the employer is required to give
the union an equal opportunity to reply unless he has no prohibition
whatever against solicitation.-After evaluating different methods of communication, the employer must judge the content of his proposed statements to determine
whether they are privileged as free speech within the terms of section
8 (c). As an indication of what he may say, the general types of
privileged statements are set forth below with specific examples.
61. E.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940); NLRB
v. McCatron, 217 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1954); Neco Elec. Prods. Corp.. 124 N.L.R.B.

481 (1959).
62. Barney's Supercenter, Inc.. 128 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1960); Vogue Lingerie Inc..
123 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1959).
63. Supra note 42.
64. Vita Food Prods., Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1956); supra note 27; supra

note 54, at 430.
65. Cooper's Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 979 (1954).
66. Supra note 54.
67. Supra note 32.
68.

Supra note 36.

69. Supra note 32.
70.

Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
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Shams: Employer Free
Speech in Union Organizing Campaigns
NOTES
Predictions are generally privileged when the employer describes
the dire results that may flow solely from union policies and practices, rather than from the employer's use of his own economic power. 7 1
The employer may state that
(1) unionization might ultimately lead to loss of employ2
ment;
(2) certain working conditions, such as coffee breaks and
73
overtime, might be changed;
(3) strikes and no steady work will result;74 and
(4) there will be a loss of business with consequent layoffs.75
The employer is also allowed to express his opinions and to advance
arguments against the union.76 The employer may
(1) describe the union leadership and his prior experiences
with unions;77
(2) disparage the integrity and responsibility of the union
and picture it as a communistic, strike-breeding, trouble-making
8
organization;7
(3) state known racketeering or other undesirable elements
that may be active in the union;79
(4) appeal to racial bias by stating that the union advocates
integration;8 0
(5) urge the employees to reject the union and tell them
that the union will do no good and could obtain no additional
benefits; 8'
(6) express disappointment concerning the advent of the
union and advise employees not to be hasty in their decision;82
71. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 106 (1953); Morganton Full Fashioned
Hosiery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1534 (1954).
72. Bilton Insulation, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 1296 (1961). The employer should
carefully avoid threatening use of his economic power to make the prophecy come
true.
73. Interstate Hosts, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1961).
74. Edmont Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 525 (1958).
75. Commercial Controls Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1957).
76. NLRB v. Armco Drainage 9: Metal Prods., Inc., 220 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1955).
77. NLRB v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 216 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1954).
78. Penokee Veneer Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1683 (1947).
79. Gazette Publishing Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1694 (1952). The employer should
avoid such statements unless assured that his information is true and can be
substantiated.
80. Sharney Hosiery Mills, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 750 (1958); Chock Full O'Nuts,
120 N.L.R.B. 1696 (1958); Contra, Empire Mfg. Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1958).
81. NLRB v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1954); Mathews
Lumber Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 322 (1951).
82. Valley Feed & Supply Co., 135 N.L.R.B ....
49 L.R.R.M. 1567 (1962).
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(7) compare conditions in other plants with existing company policies and benefits; 3 and
(8) state that if the union won the election, it would control
hiring and would replace employees with persons having greater
84
union seniority as well as undesirable persons.
The employer may also state his legal position s5 by explaining
(1)the company's rights with respect to bargaining; s1"
(2) the fact that he is obliged to negotiate with the union,
but not to sign a contract;87 and
(3) his legal right to hire a new employee to replace an)
employee who goes on strike for economic reasons.""
In the period immediately before the election the employer must
exercise extreme caution in his communications to employees to avoid
committing an unfair labor practice or creating an atmosphere in
which the election cannot properly be conducted.8 9 The "cut-off" date
which is the time at which the petition for an election is filed,9" is
of the utmost importance. The Board will not set aside an election
because of conduct before the "cut-off" (late even though the prior
conduct complained of was an unfair labor practice or would have
resulted in setting aside an election if it had occurred after the "cutoff" date. - '
An atmosphere in which elections cannot properly be conducted
may be created in a number of ways.
(1) The employer may not make a speech on company time
to a mass assembly of employees within twenty-four hours of
the time of commencement of an NLRB election.' 12 However.

he may speak to the employees within twenty-four hours of the
election if attendance is voluntary and on their own time.93
(2) The employer may not call the employees to his office
.
to interrogate them or to urge them to vote against the union. 1
(3) Neither the employer nor his supervisors may go directly
83. American Thread Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1952).
84. Supra note 77.
85. NLRB v. Sun Co., 215 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1954).
86. Schick, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1957).
87. Troy Engine & Machine Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 883 (1956). The employer
may not threaten to refuse to bargain when the union is elected.
88. Lux Clock Mfg. Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194 (1955).
89. Supra note 44.
90. Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B.
, 49 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1961).
91. Ibid.
92. Supra note 54.
93. Supra note 60; Rinn Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1958).
94. Bowmar Instrument Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1 (1959).
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